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Abstract— Widely deployed wireless network devices use a 
shared medium to communicate among mobile nodes. 
WLAN uses virtual carrier sensing mechanism to solve 
issues like hidden node problem, while this mechanism is 
vulnerable to DOS attacks e.g., RTS attack. This paper 
discusses RTS (Request to Send) attack where malicious 
nodes reserve the medium unnecessarily for overdue period 
of time. The effects of such attacks on performance of 
WLAN are observed, proposed a mitigation technique to 
restore network performance and analyzed the 
improvement in performance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless communication is the fast growing industry and 
will continue to evolve. Wireless technology provides a 
flexible data communications system that uses radio 
frequency to transmit and receive information over the air 
instead of physical wires. Wireless connectivity allows 
free movement as users are no longer bound by wires and 
can access network resources anywhere within coverage 
range of network. Such network provides reliability, 
scalability, flexibility and rapid deployment. Wireless 
networks are been widely used in Cellular networks, 
WLANs, WSN, Satellite communication etc.  
Security is highly considered factor of networks today, it 
is the protection of network resources and data 
transferred over the network. There are numerous factors 
that can affect Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability 
of a system. In order to protect the network from data 
loss, disruption or exposure certain procedures like access 
control, encryption, authentication, redundancy etc. are 
applied to improve the performance of network. 
Analyzing the performance metrics, availability is 
particularly important to keep a network’s performance. 
There are several possible Denial of Service attacks that 
can cause the disruption and decrease the network 
bandwidth & throughput by increases the delays & data 
errors. In such attacks it becomes challenging to track and 
refuse attacker’s request without refusing legitimate 
requests.  
A WLAN is a network that links two or more devices 
using a wireless medium, so that devices can 
communicate to each other within a limited range, 
depending on architecture of network. WLANs use either 
Infrastructure (centrally controlled) or Ad-hoc 
(independent) to communicate among wireless devices. 
The shared medium in wireless network raised issues like 
collision and interference which leads to higher data 
losses, low throughput, high latency and congestion that 
can be lead to failure.  
WLAN uses virtual carrier sensing mechanism to solve 
issues like hidden node problem, while this mechanism is 
vulnerable to DOS attacks e.g., RTS attack. In this 
mechanism, the node that want to communicate send an 
RTS frame holding reservation duration field (time for 
which the nodes are expecting to complete their data 
transfer). As soon as destined node receives the RTS, it 
responds with a CTS frame containing the remaining 
duration. Every other node that receives either RTS or 
CTS updates their Network Allocation Table (NAV), 
where NAV is a timer that can uniformly reduce to zero. 
The nodes other than sender/receiver are not allowed to 
transmit unless there NAV is zero, hence stay quiet for 
duration of the other conversation. After all set up, the 
node sends DATA and waits for ACK, and completes the 
process. As shown in Figure 1.   
 
 
Figure 1: Virtual Carrier Sensing Mechanism [1] 
 
This paper presented a lightweight solution for RTS 
attack’s identification and mitigation. This solution is 
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based on re-evaluation and implicit notifications in order 
to isolate malicious node.   
II. RTS ATTACK 
WLAN use control frames with 2 bytes for duration 
field which can be set as required to communicate and 
represents duration in microseconds, the standard allows 
maximum duration of 32,767us. A node with malicious 
intent can modify the RTS control frame’s set duration 
operation and replace it with a larger value to pretend that 
it needs large duration to communicate, to held the 
channel unnecessarily for overdue time and reduce the 
bandwidth utilization with increase in latency for other 
communications (c.f.  Figure 2) 
 
Figure 2: RTS Attack behavior 
 
In case of RTS attack the devices in communication 
remain in hold of channel event after the communication 
is over, they can initiate another communication and 
enforce new large NAV value and keep the hold forever. 
 
Figure 3: RTS Attack with RTS Flood 
 
I what concerns the prior work, most of the work is 
relying over periodic broadcast and/or explicit messages. 
For effective mitigation such broadcast must be very 
frequent, which increases the overhead. Following 
describe some of the related work.  
A. RELATED WORK 
Authors in [2] suggested and examine a statistical 
approach to detect the NAV attack in WLAN on MAC 
layer. Since all node return CTS in response to RTS, the 
attacker can assert large duration field as NAV to not let 
other nodes to access the medium, named the problem as 
NAV attack. The authors used statistical information 
(mean and standard deviation) of network to detect the 
attack. However, the malicious user can exploit it, by 
maintaining statistics and trying to keep its states like 
normal nodes.  
In [3], authors discussed congestion in RTS/CTS 
where nodes hold channel with RTS, and raise false 
blocking issue, therefore, no node will be able to use 
medium as they think channel is busy.  
Similarly, work in [4] analyzed Ad-Hoc network, 
where DCF is vulnerable to Denial of Service attacks. 
The attacker sends a control frame (RTS, CTS or DATA) 
to a non-existing node, while all overhearing nodes defer 
their access. They discussed the effects of these attacks 
and determine that performance is highly disturbed by 
launching RTS attack. Especially, in case when RTS is 
sent to Access Point (AP), the range of attack increases a 
lot. 
Author in [5] explored flaws of WLAN, where the 
disobedient device can stall adjacent devices from 
gaining access to medium for long duration. They 
discussed potential virtual jamming attacks like NAV 
attacks and spurious CTS, a backward compatible 
solution to avoid NAV attack was suggested to amend 
IEEE 802.11, to have ability to reset the NAV if the 
channel is found idle for long. The solution was NAV 
validation to overcome these weaknesses, the idea is to 
set extra MAC layer timers: RTS_DATAHEAD_Time 
and CTS_ACK_Time. RTS_DATAHEAD_Time keeps 
track of time between RTS and DATA packet, while 
CTS_ACK_Time keeps track of the period between CTS 
and ACK packet. The timer checks if the DATA and 
ACK packets are received as expected otherwise reset 
NAV to reset the medium. Since all devices will be 
maintaining the timers and continually sensing the 
channel they will consume a lot of energy and increase in 
overhead. 
In [6] authors studied the virtual carrier sense attacks 
and their practical effectiveness, where attacker transmits 
packets with diverse large duration values. The paper 
focused the research to study WLAN performance under 
RTS flooding Denial of Service attack, under several 
conditions such as no. of attackers, retransmissions count 
and control frames. However, the proposed solution only 
works in non-hidden scenarios where node can determine 
if CTS is for a valid RTS or not. 
While [7] discussed and exploits various attacks 
caused by control frames RTS, CTS and ACK frames. 
The attacks (Virtual Carrier Sense Flooding) are being 
established by manipulating there duration field. They 
carried numerous experiments to observe the effect of 
such attacks on wireless network. They established the 
fact that VCSF attacks can affect network more than 
those on the APs, also that the attacks using RTS are 
more disastrous than any other control frame.  
The author of [8] discussed spurious CTS attack 
(SCTS) and presented Channel Sensing based Discarding 
(CSD) mechanism where nodes consume all energy by 
keep sensing the medium after regular period.  
Hence, we proposed a solution to help to determine 
malicious intent and prevent the attack without use of any 
additional control messages, periodic polling and periodic 
broadcasts as well as maintaining table. This way we can 
avoid unnecessary overhead of additional messages and 
broad cast, as well as save energy due to avoid 
unnecessary sensing.  
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
When a node receives an RTS frame from other node, 
it can store the duration field that has come along with it. 
Send CTS as expected, with remaining duration 
mentioned in its duration field. As soon as DATA packet 
arrives at receiver node it can be analyzed to detect the 
malicious intent of sender if any. The receiver than 
evaluates the duration required for the length of this Data 
frame. Comparing the previously stored RTS duration 
and the re-evaluated duration of Data the receiver knows 
if the frame received is legitimate or malicious. The 
scheme is named RRD (Re-Evaluate RTS Duration). 
RRD Algorithm for RTS attack’s detection is described 
below:  
If Received Frame Type = RTS  
LastRTSDuration ← Frame Duration  
Send CTS Frame  
If Received Frame Type = DATA  
If (LastRTSDuration – 3*SIFS – Duration CTS – Duration ACK) >  
(Duration require of Frame Length 
or Duration field of Data Frame)  
Then Frame is Malicious 
 
Figure 4, shows RRD flowchart for attack detection.  
 
 
Figure 4: Flow chart for Detection of RTS Attack 
 
A. IMPROVEMENT IN DETECTION SCHEME 
As CTS sent in response to RTS, it calculates 
remaining duration. So we can store expected data 
duration by subtracting duration require for ACK. As 
soon as Data frame arrives its duration field can be 
compared to the stored expected duration, and determine 
if frame is malicious. This scheme seems to have the 
lower overhead in comparison to previously discussed 
steps. Algorithm of improved detection is described 
below: 
 
If Frame Received kind = RTS  
Send CTS Frame  
Calculates the Remaining Duration  
Expected_Data_Duration ← Remaining_duration  
- ACK_duration  
If Frame Received kind = DATA  
If (Expected_Data_Duration > Duration field of Data Frame) 
Then Frame is Malicious 
 
Figure 5, shows RRD flowchart for improved attack 
detection.  
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Figure 5: Flow chart for improved detection 
 
B. PREVENT AGAINST ATTACK 
The next important step is to protect network and stop 
such attacks further. We can implement prevention 
against RTS attack in two phases:  
Phase 1: If an RTS frame received from a node is 
detected malicious, we add the malicious user 
information (i.e., MAC address) to a list. To do so nodes 
should have ability to maintain Black-List, then don’t 
respond any RTS if received from a node in Black-List, 
instead the nodes will begin new cycle according to 
legacy protocol (c.f. Figure 6).  
 
 
Figure 6: Prevention against RTS Attack – Phase 1 
 
So, this node may no longer involve itself in 
communication with malicious node. It will increase the 
chances of other nodes to utilize the medium, increasing 
the throughput of network and decrease in latency. 
 
Phase 2: As soon as we detect a malicious intent of a 
node, node at receiving end can transmit information to 
other nodes to update their black-list so that they don’t 
update there NAV in case of frames received from a 
black-list node. This is done via sending a broadcast 
ACK frame, including malicious node MAC address in 
address 3 field. This ACK message plays a role of 
implicit notification for other nodes to releases their NAV 
and updates local black list.    
Since the malicious node has dedicated medium for 
conversation with another node for a long duration, it can 
send another RTS with long duration and since it may be 
greater than the current NAVs of other nodes so they will 
have to update there NAVs causing them not to access 
medium for communication. Therefore by overhearing 
ACK frame immediately after an RTS, the nodes will 
reset their NAV counters.   
All nodes maintain a black list locally and updated via 
implicit ACK control message, this way the network can 
be protected by disallowing attacker to use other node in 
network, eliminating all packet from those who have been 
detected for malicious behavior. Unlike prior work, the 
local black list is never broadcasted, thus, reducing the 
overhead. Figure 7 illustrates the idea of phase 2 
presentation.  
 
 
Figure 7: Prevention against RTS Attack – Phase 2 
 
IV. EVALUATION: 
Evaluation is based on simulations run on the MiXiM 
Framework, based OMNet++ discrete event simulator 
V5.0 using windown plateform [9].  Since, MiXiM has 
implemneted  MAC and Physical layers in details [10]. 
Therefore, we have exploited the Physical layer 
parameters using MAC frames and channel access.   
Table I lists the simulation parameters. Each simulation 
has a duration of 500 seconds and consider a scenario 
where all nodes are static.  
We investigated a typical WLAN senario composed of 
one AP (destination) and 25 nodes distributed randomly, 
where each node is a source. Each node is allocate a 
unique MAC address, and one wireless channel is shared 
among all nodes.   
We have used thourghput and latencty as performance 
parameters. All simulation were run with varying number 
of nodes (2-25).    
 
Figure 8 shows the latency analysis for network with one 
malicious node. Due to malicious node the latency 
increases, however, our proposal achieves significant 
improvement.  The gain is higher when density is high, 
due to more chances of communication.  
 
Figure 8: Latency Vs Density  
 
As a result latency is slightly higher for less number of 
nodes, because the overhead get dominating.  
 
Figure 9: Throughput Vs Density  
 
The throughput has significantly increased, due to ACK 
broadcast mechanism to allow other overhearing nodes to 
reject NAV updating for black-listed users. Therefore, 
only allowed nodes are communicating and malicious 
nodes are automatically isolated. 
 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK: 
Increasing usage of wireless has raised its importance and 
hence the network performance is a very important factor 
that needs to be maintained and improved. Wireless 
networks are vulnerable to Denial of Service attacks. This 
paper discussed RTS attack that affects the Ad-hoc 
wireless networks exploiting virtual carrier sensing 
mechanism that controls medium access for wireless 
station.  
We presented a solution based on redetermination of 
required duration mechanism to detect the attack, and 
prevent overhearing node to avoid attacker. This helps 
restore network performance.  
In future, looking forward to improve the prevention 
scheme by maintain attackers history and make decisions 
based on previous behavior so that no legitimate user get 
illuminated for false detection. This way we can extend 
the work to be incorporated in cooperative network using 
Relay Spot [11-12]. Hence, we will check how 
cooperation and network coding can affect our proposed 
solution. Then the solution will be implemented to real 
testbed and results can be analyzed to improve the 
performance. 
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